## LAW AND THE FAMILY

'Hartog' and 'Price': The 'Price' Is Right

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[New York Law Journal](http://www.nylj.com/) (p. 3, col. 1)

June 27, 1995

 IT IS TIME WE LAWYERS took a good, hard look at the 1985 Court

 of Appeals decision in Price v. Price.\*1 This infinitely manipulable

 case has brought many clients to the crossroads of settlement only

 to find themselves with high-pitched emotion leading to less than

 rational decisions. One need not be a defender of pointless laws to

 understand the wisdom behind Price.

 First, a bit of background. Domestic Relations Law

 Sec.236(B)(1)(d)(3) excludes from the definition of marital property

 ``property acquired in exchange for or the increase in value of

 separate property, except to the extent that such appreciation is

 due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse.''

 The first controversy over the meaning of this language came

 about in Jolis v. Jolis\*2 where the husband's stock in the family

 diamond business, most of which had been given to him during

 marriage by his father, and its appreciation, were held to be the

 husband's separate property. The stock greatly increased in value as

 the business prospered, being worth some $3.5 million at the time of

 the trial. Supreme Court held that the wife's contributions and

 services since 1939, which would be an important factor in

 allocating material property and setting maintenance, were not

 ``contributions'' under the statute and that, in any event, the

 appreciation resulted from inflation and market conditions.

 The trial court insisted that if the appreciation were regarded

 as marital property the wife must establish a direct correlation

 between her efforts and the appreciation. Said another way, the

 wife's 40 years of contribution and services as a mother of four

 children, homemaker, companion and entertainer of the husband's

 friends and business associates were insufficient to serve as a

 basis for her sharing the appreciation in the value of the stock

 during the marriage. The First Department affirmed the trial court's

 decision and agreed with the distinction between direct and indirect

 spousal contributions to appreciated value of separate property.

 An Economic Partnership

 In 1985, in Price v. Price, the Court of Appeals established a

 far more just standard, setting the groundwork for all that would

 follow. The court rejected the distinction made in Jolis between

 direct and indirect contributions by a spouse to the appreciation in

 value of a spouse's separately owned property during the marriage

 and also liberally construed the statute to require only that a

 relationship must be established between the ``product of the

 marital partnership'' and the appreciation in value of the separate

 property. It construed the definition of marital property liberally,

 to achieve equity in the distribution of assets produced by the

 marital partnership.\*3

 The Court of Appeals noted that equitable distribution was based

 on the premise that a marriage is an economic partnership to which

 both parties contribute as spouse, parent, wage earner or homemaker

 and that the EDL reflected an awareness that the success of the

 partnership depended, in part, on a wide range of nonremunerated

 services to the joint enterprise. The Court held that under the

 Equitable Distribution Law (EDL) an increase in the value of the

 separate property of one spouse, occurring during the marriage and

 prior to the commencement of matrimonial proceedings, which is due

 in part to the indirect contributions or efforts of the other spouse

 as homemaker and parent, should be considered marital property. It

 did caution, however, that:

 Whether assistance of a nontitled spouse, when indirect, can be said

 to have contributed ``in part'' to the appreciation of an asset

 depends primarily upon the nature of the asset and whether its

 appreciation was due in some measure to the time and efforts of the

 titled spouse. If such efforts . . . were aided and the time

 devoted to the enterprise made possible, at least in part, by the

 indirect contributions of the nontitled spouse, the appreciation

 should, to the extent it was produced by the efforts of the titled

 spouse, be considered a product of the marital partnership and hence

 marital property. \* \* \* As a general rule, however, where the

 appreciation is not due, in any part, to the efforts of the titled

 spouse but to the efforts of others or to unrelated factors

 including inflation or other market forces, as in the case of a

 mutual fund, an investment in unimproved land, or in a work of art,

 the appreciation remains separate property, and the nontitled spouse

 has no claim to a share of the appreciation.

 The Price Court held that the nontitled spouse must demonstrate

 that (1) the property appreciated in value during the marriage, in

 part, because of efforts or contributions of the titled spouse in

 time, money or energy; and (2) he or she contributed, in part, to

 such appreciation as a homemaker or parent by giving the titled

 spouse the time to devote to the enterprise. Where an asset

 appreciates passively during the marriage solely as a result of the

 efforts of others or market forces, the nontitled spouse is not

 entitled to share in the appreciation, since it was not the efforts

 of the titled spouse that contributed to the increase in value of

 the asset.

 Price, however, left unresolved nearly as many issues as it

 solved. Most notably, whether in determining if the nontitled spouse

 contributed to the appreciation of separate property, he or she is

 required to establish a substantial, almost quantifiable, connection

 between the titled spouses' efforts and the appreciated value of the

 property. In its most recent follow up to Price, the Court of

 Appeals in Hartog v. Hartog\*4 ruled ``no'' to this question.

 Involvement in `Separate Property'

 In Hartog v. Hartog, the key issue was whether the husband's

 limited involvement during the marriage in ``separate property''

 businesses that appreciated in value, qualified as active

 participation, within the meaning of Price, so as to transmute the

 appreciation into marital property subject to equitable

 distribution. The parties weremarried in 1968. The wife was a

 homemaker from 1969 until May 1980. From 1980 through 1985, she

 worked full time at an advertising firm. In 1990, she started a song

 writing business, from which she earned nothing. During the

 marriage, she was a traditional homemaker, serving in roles of

 spouse, parent, housekeeper and hostess. When the parties divorced,

 she was 51 years old and he was 61. Two children were born of the

 marriage, both emancipated at the time of divorce.

 When they married, the husband was 38 and worked in a family

 jewelry business, F. Staal. He was also a shareholder and director

 of another family business, Hartog Trading Co. (Trading). He owned

 50 percent of the stock in F. Staal and Trading, and 25 percent of

 the stock of Hartog Foods International Inc. (Foods), a spin-off

 company of Trading. He was director of Trading throughout the

 marriage and was its secretary/treasurer from 1969. He was a

 director and secretary of Foods from the time of its incorporation

 in 1969.

 The husband's brother or others, however, had primary

 responsibility for the day-to-day management and operation of

 Trading and Foods. F. Staal, Trading and Foods, each deducted a

 salary for the husband as a business expense, and he participated in

 their respective profit-sharing plans. The corporate tax returns of

 Trading and Foods listed him as a part-time employee, and the

 corporate minutes note his presence at meetings and his power to

 sign checks. Testimony at trial indicated that the husband and his

 brother conferred at times regarding business matters concerning

 Trading and Foods. The husband was recently diagnosed with prostate

 cancer.

 Marital Property

 Supreme Court granted the wife a divorce and distributed the

 marital property. She ultimately opted to sell both residences,

 resulting in a distributive award of $1.7 million. The trial court

 found the following to be marital property: (1) 100 percent of the

 increased value of the husband's 50 percent share in F. Staal

 ($412,000); (2) 25 percent of the appreciation of the husband's 50

 percent share of Trading ($575,000); and (3) 25 percent of the

 appreciation of the husband's 25 percent share of Foods ($686,875).

 The court also declared the husband's annual bonus to be marital

 property. It awarded the wife maintenance in the amount of $2,816.66

 per month until her death. It also ordered the husband to maintain a

 $1 million life insurance policy for his wife's benefit and provided

 that in the event the policy was not in effect on his death, the

 amount of the insurance would constitute a pro rata lien against his

 estate.

 The Appellate Division modified and affirmed the judgment. It

 deleted that portion of the distributive award to the wife that

 represented her portion of the appreciated value of Trading and

 Foods, $630,937.50, which is half of 25 percent (the increased value

 of the husband's interest in Trading and Foods, the separate asset).

 It also deleted the share awarded the wife in the husband's bonus

 ($59,998); a portion of the tax liability attributed to the husband

 resulting from the sale of marital assets; and an award of $197,585,

 representing half of the husband's brokerage account [not in issue].

 It limited the award of spousal maintenance of $650 per week to five

 years, and deleted the provisions directing the husband to maintain

 life insurance and establishing a conditional lien.

 In the Court of Appeals the wife argued that because the husband

 had some active involvement in Trading and in Foods, the

 appreciation in value of those businesses, at least to some degree,

 was marital property subject to equitable distribution. She claimed

 that the Appellate Division imposed a substantial nexus requirement

 of a significant connection between the titled spouse's activity and

 the appreciation of the operating business assets and that this (1)

 is contrary to legislative intent, to construe the term ``marital

 property'' broadly; and, (2) is contrary to the Court's holding and

 rationale in Price v. Price that a titled spouse's ``active''

 contribution to the separate asset during the marriage transforms at

 least some portion of the appreciated value into marital property.

 The husband countered by arguing that his activities amounted to

 ``paper participation'' only, and that this type of pro forma

 involvement had no actual impact on the appreciation in the value of

 the businesses. He asserted that absent some concrete showing by the

 wife of how his involvement actually benefited the businesses'

 value, the appreciation in those businesses remained separate

 property in its entirety.

 Letter and Spirit

 The Court of Appeals held that requiring a non-titled spouse to

 show a substantial, almost quantifiable, connection between the

 titled spouse's efforts and the appreciated value of the asset would

 be contrary to the letter and spirit of DRL Sec.Sec.236(B)(1)(c),

 (B)(1)(d)(3), (B)(5)(c) and (B)(5)(d)(6). DRL Sec.236(B)(1)(d)(3)

 expressly provides that appreciation in separate property remains

 separate property, ``except to the extent that such appreciation is

 due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse.''

 It reasoned that DRL Sec.236(B)(5)(d)(6) explicitly recognizes

 that indirect contributions of the non-titled spouse (e.g., services

 as spouse, parent and homemaker and contributions to the other

 party's career or career potential) are equally relevant to direct

 contributions in equitable disposition calculations. Thus, to the

 extent that the appreciated value of separate property is at all

 aided or facilitated'' by the non-titled spouse's direct or indirect

 efforts, that part of the appreciation is marital property subject

 to equitable distribution.

 Consequently, while some connection between the titled spouse's

 effort and the appreciation must be discernible from the evidence,

 neither the statutory language nor its legislative history justifies

 the Appellate Division's and the husband's exacting causation

 prerequisite. The Court of Appeals also held that requiring such a

 connection was inconsistent with the legislative intent in enacting

 the EDL, to treat marriage in one respect as an economic partnership

 and, in so doing, to recognize the direct and indirect contributions

 of each spouse, including homemakers, and that such a result was at

 odds with Price.

 The Court of Appeals in Hartog recognized that it was time for

 it to realistically handle the problem faced when the titled spouse

 has only limited, yet active, involvement in a separate asset of a

 non-passive character where it may be difficult, if not impossible,

 to link limited, specific efforts to quantifiable, tangible results

 and to prove a direct causal link between the activity and the

 resulting appreciation.

 The Court rejected the causation requirement urged by the

 husband. Instead it gave effect to the Legislature's intent that a

 non-titled spouse be permitted to share in the ``indirect'' fruits

 of his or her labor, even if the connection between the titled

 spouse's activity and the appreciation is not established with

 mathematical, causative or analytical precision. It noted that its

 holding in Price supported the analysis it adopted and `` . . .

 inevitable implication of Price was a rejection of the ``all or

 nothing'' approach that would be interposed by adopting a

 particularized causative nexus requirement.'' It concluded:

 . . . that where an asset, like an ongoing business, is, by its

 very nature, non-passive and sufficient facts exist from which the

 factfinder may conclude that the titled spouse engaged in active

 efforts with respect to that asset, even to a small degree, then the

 appreciation in that asset is, to a proportionate degree, marital

 property. By considering the extent and significance of the titled

 spouse's efforts in relation to the active efforts of others and any

 additional passive or active factors, the factfinder must then

 determine what percentage of the total appreciation constitutes

 marital property subject to equitable distribution . . .

 Limited, but Active

 Applying these principles the Court concluded that the Appellate

 Division should not have deemed the total amount of the appreciation

 in Trading and Foods to be the husband's separate property. The

 trial court's findings demonstrated that the husband engaged in

 limited, active involvement in the two companies. His activities

 consisted of attendance at board meetings; holding officers'

 positions within the close corporations; being listed as a salaried

 employee; discussing and conferring on business matters; signing

 checks on occasion; and participating in the companies'

 profitsharing plans. These efforts constituted an ``active''

 involvement and management role.

 The Court held that through the husband's attendance at board

 meetings and business discussions with family members, particularly

 during times of crisis, a reasonable finder of fact could determine

 that this active involvement contributed to the appreciated value of

 the businesses. The Court reinstated the Supreme Court's

 determination that 25 percent of the appreciated value of the

 husband's interests in Trading and in Foods was marital property.

 The Court of Appeals also held that the Legislature intended

 that the predivorce standard of living be a mandatory factor for the

 courts consideration in determining the amount and duration of the

 maintenance award and that the Appellate Division erred in failing

 to consider the wife's pre-divorce standard of living. It pointed

 out that DRL Sec.236, as amended in 1986, directs that when the

 court is considering an award of maintenance, it must ``hav[e]

 regard for the standard of living of the parties established during

 the marriage.''

 The purpose of the amendment was to ``require[] the court to

 consider the marital standard of living'' in making maintenance

 awards. Generally the lower courts' failure to analyze each of the

 statutory maintenance factors in DRL Sec.Sec.236 (B)(6)(a)(1)-(11)

 will not alone warrant appellate alteration of the award, because it

 suffices for a court to set forth the factors it did consider and

 the reasons for its decision. However, the pre-divorce standard of

 living has been placed by the Legislature in a markedly distinct

 category, rendering the general rule inapplicable.

 The Court held that the Appellate Division's assertion of the

 wife's ability to become self-supporting with respect to some

 standard of living in no way obviated the need for the court to

 consider the pre-divorce standard of living; and did not create a

 per se bar to lifetime maintenance. Correspondingly, a pre-divorce

 ``high life'' standard of living guarantees no per se entitlement to

 an award of lifetime maintenance. ``The lower courts must consider

 the payee spouse's reasonable needs and pre-divorce standard of

 living in the context of the other enumerated statutory factors, and

 then, in their discretion, fashion a fair and equitable maintenance

 award accordingly . . . .''

 Because this is what Supreme Court did, and the Appellate

 Division's alteration of that award for the reason it advanced was

 not warranted, the Court modified and reinstated the trial court's

 determination awarding lifetime maintenance in the amount of $2,816

 per month.\*5

 It would seem that what best serves the objectives and purposes

 of the EDL, as well as the underlying public policy, is to give

 broad and liberal interpretation to the statutory definition of

 ``marital property'' and narrowly construe the exemptions from

 equitable distribution, which are designated as ``separate

 property.'' When in doubt, one should side in favor of the marital

 property category.

 notes

 (1) 1985, 2d Dept., 113 AD2d 299, 496 NYS2d 455, later

 proceeding 2d Dept.) 115 AD2d 530, 496 NYS2d 464, later proceeding

 (2d Dept.) 115 AD2d 531, 496 NYS2d 689 and ctfd uqes ans, affd 69

 NY2d 8, 511 NYS2d 219, 503 NE2d 684.

 (2) 111 Misc2d 965, 446 NYS2d 138, affd (1st Dept.) 98 AD2d 692,

 470 NYS2d 584.

 (3) 1986, 69 NY2d 8, 511 NYS2d 219, 503 NE2d 684.

 (4) 85 NY2d 36, NYS2d (1995).

 (5) The Court of Appeals also held: (1) that the husband's

 bonus, earned during the course of the marriage but paid after

 commencement of marital dissolution proceedings was marital property

 subject to equitable distribution, noting that the Appellate

 Divisions rationale failed to heed its precedents and the generous

 reading that the Legislature intended to be accorded the term

 marital property in this respect; (2) that, while under DRL

 Sec.236(B)(8)(a), the courts have the general authority to ``order a

 party to purchase, maintain or assign a policy of insurance on the

 life of either spouse'' as a means to secure maintenance and child

 support payments, so that dependent spouses and children will be

 adequately protected, the trial court erred by ordering the husband

 to obtain a life insurance policy. Because of his serious illness,

 the husband was uncontestedly uninsurable, and the proof at trial

 established the lack of any extant life insurance available when the

 relief was directed in the judgment; (3) that the courts have no

 inherent authority to order a lien on a spouse's estate in lieu of

 insurance. There is no statutory authority or suggestion in the

 legislative history that the courts were meant to exercise such

 broad-reaching power to create a lien on an estate for a payor

 spouse's failure to maintain life insurance; and (4) that the

 Appellate Division acted properly in considering the tax

 consequences to the husband and reducing plaintiff-wife's

 distributive award by her equitable share of the tax liability.

 Given the non-liquid nature of the assets, the Appellate Division

 did not abuse its discretion in making the wife responsible for an

 equitable share of the tax consequences.

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