## LAW AND THE FAMILY

The Changes in Calculating Child Support

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 CREATED ON JULY 17, 1989, the child support guidelines law,

 commonly known as the ``Child Support Standards Act'' (CSSA)\*1 was,

 until recently, one part mathematical formula, one part

 discretionary. In the trade the equation is well known. Mathematical

 calculations applied up to $80,000; discretion over $80,000. Hold

 everything because the Court of Appeals has just changed things.

 The 1989 legislation brought us a new era in child support

 awards. The CSSA adopts a rebuttable presumption containing a

 numerical formula for determining the level of child support. The

 application of the formula is based on a percentage of the combined

 gross income of the parents and the number of children to be

 supported. First, the court calculated the ``combined parental

 income''\*2 and then it was multiplied by the appropriate child

 support percentage. Parenthetically, the ``child support

 percentage'' is defined as: 17 percent of the combined parental

 income for one child; 25 percent of the combined parental income for

 two children; 29 percent of the combined parental income for three

 children; 31 percent of the combined parental income for four

 children; and no less than 35 percent of the combined parental

 income for five or more children. Where there are five or more

 children, the court must exercise its discretion as to the amount of

 the child support percentage.\*3

 Discretion and Obligations

 The public policy enunciated in CSSA Sec.1 is clearly aimed at

 establishing guidelines that permit judicial discretion while

 setting forth minimum and meaningful standards of obligation in

 which both parents share the responsibility of child support. The

 Assembly memorandum suggests the law is premised on two basic

 concepts. First, both parents have a responsibility to contribute to

 the economic wellbeing of their children and to provide support,

 regardless of their level of income. Secondly, children must be

 protected to the greatest extent possible from the reduced living

 standards naturally resulting from parents maintaining two separate

 households.

 In doing the calculation, Domestic Relations Law (DRL) Sec.240,

 Subdivision 1-b (c)(2), directs the court to multiply the combined

 parental income up to $80,000 by the appropriate child support

 percentage, thereafter prorating between parents in the same

 proportion as each parent's income is to the combined parental

 income. The CSSA requires the non-custodial parent to pay as child

 support a prorata share of the ``basic child support obligation''

 unless the court finds that a variation of the support amount is

 appropriate because it is otherwise unjust or inappropriate. In

 reaching its determination, the court must weigh 10 factors,

 thereafter setting forth in a written decision the factors it

 considered and the reasons for the level of support. This formal

 explanation may not be waived by either party or counsel.

 As to the combined parental income in excess of $80,000 DRL

 Sec.240, Subdivision 1b(c)(3) provides that ``the Court shall

 determine the amount of child support for the amount of the combined

 parental income in excess of such dollar amount through

 consideration of the factors set forth in Paragraph (f) of this

 Subdivision and/or the child support percentage.'' (emphasis

 supplied)

 The factors are:

 (1) The financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial

 parent, and those of the child;

 (2) The physical and emotional health of the child and his/her

 special needs and aptitudes;

 (3) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the

 marriage or household not been dissolved;

 (4) The tax consequences to the parties;

 (5) The non-monetary contributions that the parents will make

 toward the care and well-being of the child;

 (6) The educational needs of either parent;

 (7) A determination that the gross income of one parent is

 substantially less than the other parent's gross income;

 (8) The needs of the children of the non-custodial parent for

 whom the non-custodial parent is providing support who are not

 subject to the instant action and whose support has not already been

 deducted from income, and the financial resources of any person

 obligated to support such children; provided, however, that this

 factor may apply only if the resources available to support such

 children are less than the resources available to support the

 children who are subject to the instant action;

 (9) Provided that the child is not on public assistance, (i)

 extraordinary expenses incurred by the noncustodial parent in

 exercising visitation; or (ii) expenses incurred by the non-

 custodial parent in extended visitation, provided that the custodial

 parent's expenses are substantially reduced as a result thereof; and

 (10) Any other factors the court determines are relevant in each

 case.

 Combined Parental Income

 One of the more controversial issues attached to this law was

 the implementation of the formula approach across the board to the

 entire combined parental income. The issue was engendered by the

 decision in In Re JT\*4 where the petitioner's income was $20,041 and

 the respondent's income as a baseball player was $358,152 based on

 1989 income figures.

 The hearing examiner found the combined parental income was 94

 percent respondent's and 6 percent petitioner's and awarded

 petitioner child support for her 6-yearold child in the amount of 17

 percent ($60,000) of the entire combined parental income. The

 decision was unusual in that the court directed that $500 was to be

 paid each week for the child's ``current needs and expenses'' and

 thebalance of $34,000 to be put into a CD or savings account to

 provide for the child's future educational expenses.

 Soon after this decision a flurry of decisions followed

 concluding that the court should not blindly apply the statutory

 formula to the combined parental income in excess of $80,000 without

 considering the child's actual reasonable needs.\*5

 A forerunner of these decisions is Chasin v. Chasin\*6 where the

 Supreme Court directed the husband to pay, among other things, child

 support, health insurance premiums, uninsured medical/dental

 expenses and 78 percent of the children's college costs. The

 Appellate Division, Third Department, held that the child support

 award was excessive and that the Supreme Court did not follow the

 mandates of the CSSA. Without comment or reasoning, a flat 25

 percent was applied to the parties' combined gross annual income of

 $166,763, including that which exceeded $80,000. The Supreme Court

 allocated 78 percent as the husband's share of child support and 22

 percent as the wife's share.

 The Appellate Division held that this was in error, stating that

 the blind application of the statutory formula to the combined

 parental income over $80,000 without any express findings of the

 children's actual needs constituted an abdication of judicial

 responsibility and rendered meaningless the statutory provision

 setting a cap on strict application of the formula.

 In Reiss v. Reiss,\*7 the Appellate Division, Second Department,

 held, among other things, that the trial court's award of more than

 $32,000 a year in child support was excessive. The court simply held

 that the record revealed that the application of the statutory

 percentage set forth in DRL Sec.240(1-b)(b)(3)(i) to the portions of

 defendant's annual income that exceeded $80,000 constituted an

 improvident exercise of discretion when measured against the

 parties' respective financial circumstances and the reasonable

 support requirements of the parties' son.

 No Blind Application

 Harmon v. Harmon\*8 has been the leading case on the subject.

 There the Supreme Court directed the husband to pay $582 per week

 child support for the parties' son until the child entered college.

 In arriving at child support figures, the trial court applied the

 CSSA and applied the formula without explanation to the combined

 parental income in excess of $80,000. For the period from Sept. 4,

 1990, through the son's 21st birthday, the Supreme Court awarded the

 wife $437 a week for the son.

 The Appellate Division, First Department, remanded, directing

 the court to take evidence on the approximate amount of child

 support in accordance with the CSSA and to calculate the obligations

 of the parties in accordance with it. It held that the child-support

 formula should not be blindly applied to the parental income in

 excess of $80,000 without giving consideration to the child's actual

 needs. The court pointed out that where the combined parental income

 exceeds $80,000, there is discretion allowed to the court.

 In such cases, the court may determine the amount of child

 support with respect to the amount of income in excess of $80,000

 either through consideration of the statutory factors set forth in

 DRL Sec.240(1-b)(f) and/or the child support percentage. Thus, the

 court, under either the ``standard of living the child would have

 enjoyed had the marriage or household not been dissolved'' or the

 catch-all, ``[a]ny other factors the Court determines are relevant

 in each case,'' provision (id., Sec.Sec.240[1-b][f][3] and [10]), is

 able to consider the child's ``actual reasonable needs'' in

 determining the amount of child support for the amount of the

 combined parental income in excess of $80,000.''

 The court concluded a blind application of the statutory formula

 to the parties' aggregate income over $80,000 without any express

 findings or record evidence of the child's actual needs constituted

 an abdication of the court's judicial responsibility and a trespass

 upon the right of parents to make lifestyle choices for their

 children. Although entitled to support in accordance with the pre-

 separation standard, a child is not a partner in the marital

 relationship, entitled to a ``piece of the action.'' Accordingly,

 the matter was remanded to take evidence on the appropriate amount

 of child support in accordance with the CSSA and to calculate the

 obligations of the parties in accordance with it.\*9

 `Cassano'

 Against this background, the Court of Appeals held on May 9, in

 a revolutionary opinion in Cassano v. Cassano, that under the facts

 of that case, absent extraordinary circumstances, the child support

 percentage should be applied to the combined parental income in

 excess of $80,000.\*10 In Cassano v. Cassano\*11 the Appellate

 Division, Second Department, modified an order of the Family Court,

 which, after a hearing, directed the former husband to pay 64.4

 percent of his son's private school tuition; directed him to pay all

 unreimbursed health expenses for the child; and upwardly modified

 child support to $218 per week, based on combined parental income of

 $99,964.

 The father argued before the Family Court that the Hearing

 Examiner erred in applying the statutory percentage to income in

 excess of $80,000 without setting of the reasons for the particular

 award. The Family Court concluded that this was permissible under

 the statute and, absent good cause, refused to interfere with the

 hearing examiners exercise of discretion. The Appellate Division

 confirmed the father's position that Family Court was required to

 state reasons for the award of child support on combined parental

 income exceeding $80,000 but found that the requirement was

 satisfied by the Hearing Examiner's in-depth consideration of the

 parties' circumstances and affirmed the award.

 The court granted the father's objection to that portion of the

 order which directed him to pay 64.4 percent of his son's private

 school tuition. The Appellate Division found that the Family Court

 erred in directing the father to pay 64.4 percent of his son's

 private schooling but sustained the child support award. The husband

 in Cassano also argued that it was error for Family Court to require

 him to pay his share of future unreimbursed medical expenses because

 the law had been that ``open ended'' awards were improper. The

 Appellate Division rejected this argument, noting that the various

 cases that had been cited for that proposition reflected the state

 of the law that existed before the enactment of Family Court Act

 Sec.413(1)(c)(5) and DRL Sec.240(1-b)(c)(5) and to the extent that

 they conflicted with its holding were no longer valid.

 The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate

 Division in a written opinion by Judge Kaye. In its decision the

 Court cited the policy behind the CSSA to replace `` . . . a needs-

 based discretionary system with a precisely articulated, threestep

 method for determining child support'' and that the enactment of the

 statute ``signalled a new era in calculating child support awards.''

 It noted that the emphasis was ``to shift from a balancing of the

 expressed needs of the child and the income available to the parents

 after expenses to the total income available to the parents and the

 standard of living that should be shared with the child.''

 The [limited] question before the Court was ``whether the Court

 must articulate a reason for its award of child support on parental

 income exceeding $80,000 when it chooses simply to apply the

 statutory percentage.'' The Court focused on the language of DRL

 Sec.240, Subdivision 1-b(c)(3), which provides that ``the Court

 shall determine the amount of child support for the amount of the

 combined parental income in excess of such dollar amount through

 consideration of the factors set forth in Paragraph (f) of this

 Subdivision and/or the child support percentage.''

 Significantly, it held that the provision allowing the court to

 disregard the formula if ``unjust and inappropriate'' was pertinent

 to income over $80,000, as well as under $80,000. The court noted,

 however, if it disregards the formula reasons must be set forth in a

 formal written order, which cannot be waived by either party.\*12

 The court noted that the parties' arguments for and against

 requiring an elaboration of reasons where the statutory percentage

 is applied to income exceeding $80,000 centered on the term ``and/

 or.'' The statutes' overall objectives must be considered in

 determining the meaning of that term. In rejecting the father's

 argument that a reason must be stated for the child support award

 that relates to the needs of the child the court concluded such a

 reading of the statute would roll ``back the calendar to pre-1989

 law.''

 The court reasoned: ``In our view, `and/or' should be read to

 afford courts the discretion to apply the `paragraph (f)' factors,

 or to apply the statutory percentages, or to apply both in fixing

 the basic child support obligation on parental income over $80,000.

 That interpretation is consistent with the language of the section

 and the objectives of the Child Support Standards Act.''

 The court cautioned that the exercise of discretion by the court

 is subject to review for abuse, and that some record articulation of

 the reasons for the court's choice to apply the percentage to the

 combined parental income over $80,000 is necessary to facilitate

 that review. ``The stated basis for an exercise of discretion to

 apply the formula to income over $80,000 should, in sum and

 substance, reflect both that the court has carefully considered the

 parties circumstances and that it has found no reason why there

 should be a departure from the prescribed percentage.'' The court

 determined that as there was ``no extraordinary circumstances

 present'' application of the statutory percentage to the income

 above the $80,000 was justified and not an abuse of discretion.

 The court also rejected the defendant's argument that it was

 error for Family Court to require him to pay his share of future

 unreimbursed medical expenses because the law had been that ``open

 ended'' awards were improper. The Court of Appeals held that the

 argument was meritless in light of the act's specific provisions

 which require the Court to apportion health care expenses.\*13

 notes

 (1) See Laws of 1989, Ch 567.

 (2) FCA 413 (1)(b)(4)-(5).

 (3) FCA 413(1)(b)(3); DRL 240(1-b)(b)(3).

 (4) In Re J.T., New York Law Journal, Nov. 7, 1989, p.27, Col.3,

 Fam. Ct. Suffolk Co., (Silverman, H.E.).

 (5) FCA 413(1)(c)(3); DRL Sec.240(1-b)(c)(3).

 (6) 1992, 3d Dept. 182 AD2d 862, 582 NYS2d 512, related

 proceeding (AD3d Dept.) 600 NYS2d 324.

 (7) 1991, 2d Dept. 170 AD2d 589, 566 NYS2d 365, app dismd

 without op 78 NY2d 908, 573 NYS2d 469, 577 NE2d 1061 and app den 79

 NY2d 758, 584 NYS2d 446, 594 NE2d 940.

 (8) 1992, 1st Dept. 173 AD2d 98, 578 NYS2d 897.

 (9) See also Kessinger v. Kessinger, 202 AD2d 752, 608 NYS2d 358

 (3d Dept. 1994) and Faber v. Faber, ---- AD2d ---- , 614 NYS 771

 (3d Dept., 1994)

 (10) ---- NY2d ---- , ---- NYS2d ---- , NYLJ, May 10, 1995,

 p.25, col. 1. The propriety of the award of private school costs was

 not before the court. (11) 203 App Div 2d 563, 612 NYS2d 160 (2d

 Dept. 1994).

 (12) Citing FCA Sec.413[1][g].

 (13) See Family Court Act 413 (1)(c)(5) and DRL Sec.240(1-

 b)(c)(5).

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