Recent Decisions and News
First Department Holds "Presumption of Legitimacy"applies to a Child Born to a Same-sex Married Couple
In re Maria-Irene D, 2017 WL 4287334 (1st Dept., 2017) the Appellate Division affirmed an order which vacated an adoption. Appellant Marco D. and respondent Han Ming T. (Ming), both British citizens, entered a civil union in the United Kingdom (UK) in 2008, which they converted into a legal marriage in 2015, effective as of the date of their civil union. In 2013, the couple jointly executed an egg donor and surrogacy agreement with the intention of becoming parents. Both contributed sperm, and the embryo fertilized by Marco’s sperm was transferred to the surrogate. The child was born in September 2014. The couple commenced a proceeding in Missouri to terminate the egg donor and surrogate’s parental rights to the child. In October 2014, the Missouri court awarded Marco, as the genetic father, “sole and exclusive custody” of the child. Marco, Ming, and the child returned to Florida, where they lived as a family until October 2015, when Ming returned to the UK to seek employment. At some point in or after 2013, Marco entered a relationship with petitioner Carlos A., and they moved to New York with the child after Ming went to the UK. In January 2016, Carlos filed a petition in New York to adopt the child. In the adoption papers, Carlos disclosed that Marco and Ming were married in 2008, but alleged that they had not lived together continuously since 2012 and that Carlos and Marco had been caring for the child since her birth. A home study report stated that Marco and Ming legally separated in 2013 and had no children together. Ming’s role in the surrogacy process was not disclosed, nor was the Florida divorce action commenced by Ming in March 2016 in which he sought joint custody of the child.
Family Court granted Ming’s motion, and vacated the adoption pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 114(3), finding that Carlos and Marco had made material misrepresentations to the court that provided sufficient cause to vacate, and that Ming was entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding. The Appellate Division affirmed. It found that Ming and Marco’s marriage in the UK was effective as of August 2008. New York courts as a matter of comity will recognize such out-of-state marriages (see e.g. Matter of Mott v. Duncan Petroleum Trans., 51 N.Y.2d 289, 292  ). The child was born in 2014, as the result of jointly executed surrogacy agreements, at a time when the couple was considered legally married, thus giving rise to the presumption that the child was the legitimate child of both Marco and Ming (see Domestic Relations Law § 24; Matter of Fay, 44 N.Y.2d 137 ). After the child was born, Marco, Ming and the child lived together as a family, and the couple took affirmative steps in the UK to establish Ming’s parental rights in accordance with UK law. Under these circumstances, the Missouri judgment in 2014 awarding Marco sole and exclusive custody of the child, as opposed to the egg donor and surrogate, was insufficient to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. Marco and Ming were deemed legally married when they embarked on the surrogacy process to have a child together (see Debra H. v. Janice R., 14 NY3d 576 , cert denied 562 U.S. 1136  ). Accordingly, the child was born in wedlock, and Ming was entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding (see Domestic Relations Law § 111[b] ). Petitioner’s failure to disclose the Florida divorce action, in which the child was named as a child of the marriage and Ming sought joint custody, provided another ground to vacate the adoption (see Domestic Relations Law § 114 ). The adoption petition required petitioner to give a sworn statement that the child to be adopted was not the subject of any proceeding affecting his or her custody or status. Even though petitioner was aware of the Florida divorce action before finalization of the adoption, he failed to disclose the action to the court, instead averring in a supplemental affidavit that there had been no change in circumstances “whatsoever” since the filing of the adoption petition.
Religious Upbringing Clause in Custody Agreement Cannot Be Enforced Extent it is not in Best Interests of Children or Violates Parent’s Legitimate Due Process Right to Express Oneself and Live Freely.
In Weisberger v Weisberger, --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2017 WL 3496090, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 06212 (2d Dept., 2017) in their stipulation of settlement dated November 3, 2008, which was incorporated but not merged into their 2009 judgment of divorce, the parties agreed to joint legal custody of the children with the mother having primary residential custody and the father having specified visitation. The stipulation contained the following religious upbringing clause: “Parties agree to give the children a Hasidic upbringing in all details, in home or outside of home, compatible with that of their families’. Father shall decide which school the children attend. Mother to insure that the children arrive in school in a timely manner and have all their needs provided.”The stipulation of settlement further provided that each party “shall be free from interference, authority and control, direct or indirect, by the other.”
In November 2012, at which time the children were nine, seven, and five years old, respectively, the father moved to modify the stipulation of settlement so as to, inter alia, award him sole legal and residential custody of the children; award the mother only supervised therapeutic visitation; and to enforce the religious upbringing clause so as to require the mother to direct the children to practice full religious observance in accordance with the Jewish Hasidic practices of ultra Orthodoxy at all times and require her to practice full religious observance in accordance with the Hasidic practices of ultra Orthodoxy during any period in which she has physical custody of the children and at any appearance at the children’s schools. In support of the motion, the father alleged that the mother had radically changed her lifestyle in a way that conflicted with the parties’ religious upbringing clause. The father alleged that since the parties had entered into the stipulation of settlement the mother had, among other things, come out publicly as a lesbian, disparaged the basic tenets of Hasidic Judaism in front of the children, allowed the children to wear non-Hasidic clothes, permitted them to violate the Sabbath and kosher dietary laws, and referred to them by names that were not traditionally used in the Hasidic community. The father further alleged that the mother had dressed immodestly, dyed her hair, and permitted a transgender man to reside in her home with the children.
Supreme Court determined that there had been a change of circumstances caused by the mother’s transition from an ultra Orthodox Hasidic lifestyle to a “more progressive, albeit Jewish, secular world.” The court noted that the mother’s conduct was in conflict with the parties’ agreement, which “forbade living a secular way of life in front of the children or while at their schools.” The court posited that had there been no agreement it might have considered the parties’ arguments differently; however, “given the existence of the Agreement’s very clear directives, [the] Court was obligated to consider the religious upbringing of the children as a paramount factor in any custody determination”. Supreme Court awarded him sole legal and residential custody of the children, as well as final decision-making authority over medical and dental issues, and issues of mental health, with supervised therapeutic visitation to the mother. The court stayed the provision of the order limiting the mother’s visitation to supervised therapeutic visits, conditioned upon, inter alia, her compliance with the religious upbringing clause. Supreme Court enforced the religious upbringing clause so as to require the mother to direct the children to practice full religious observance in accordance with the Hasidic practices of ultra Orthodoxy at all times. The court ordered that during any period of visitation or during any appearance at the childrens’ schools “the [mother] must practice full religious observance in accordance with the Hasidic practices of ultra Orthodoxy.”
The Appellate Division modified the order. It observed that to the extent the mother’s sexual orientation was raised at the hearing, courts must remain neutral toward such matters, such that the focus remains on the continued best interests and welfare of the children. The Appellate Division found that a change of circumstances had occurred, such that a modification of the stipulation of settlement was necessary However, Supreme Court’s determination to modify the stipulation of settlement so as to, inter alia, award the father sole legal and residential custody of the children, lacked a sound and substantial basis in the record In pertinent part, the court gave undue weight to the parties’ religious upbringing clause, finding it to be a “paramount factor” in its custody determination. It held that when presented as an issue, religion may be considered as one of the factors in determining the best interest of a child, although it alone may not be the determinative factor. Clauses in custody agreements that provide for a specific religious upbringing for the children will only be enforced so long as the agreement is in the best interests of the children. It found that the mother had been the children’s primary caretaker since birth, and their emotional and intellectual development was closely tied to their relationship with her. The mother took care of the children’s physical and emotional needs both during and after the marriage, while the father consistently failed to fully exercise his visitation rights or fulfill his most basic financial obligations to the children after the parties’ separation. Aside from objecting to her decision to expose the children to views to which he personally objected, the father expressed no doubts whatsoever about the mother’s ability to care and provide for the children. The weight of the evidence established that awarding the father full legal and residential custody of the children with limited visitation to the mother would be harmful to the children’s relationship with her.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court improperly directed that enforcement of the parties’ stipulation of settlement which required the mother to practice full religious observance in accordance with the Hasidic practices of ultra Orthodoxy during any period in which she has physical custody of the children and at any appearance at the children’s schools. The plain language of the parties’ agreement was “to give the children a Hasidic upbringing”. The parties’ agreement did not require the mother to practice any type of religion, to dress in any particular way, or to hide her views or identity from the children. Nor may the courts compel any person to adopt any particular religious lifestyle. At a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise” (Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587). Thus, it held that a religious upbringing clause should not, and cannot, be enforced to the extent that it violates a parent’s legitimate due process right to express oneself and live freely (see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574. The parties themselves agreed in the stipulation of settlement that they “shall [each] be free from interference, authority and control, direct or indirect, by the other” (emphasis added). The weight of the evidence did not support the conclusion that it was in the children’s best interests to have their mother categorically conceal the true nature of her feelings and beliefs from them at all times and in all respects, or to otherwise force her to adhere to practices and beliefs that she no longer shares. There was no indication or allegation that the mother’s feelings and beliefs were not sincerely held, or that they were adopted for the purpose of subverting the religious upbringing clause, and there had been no showing that they are inherently harmful to the children’s well-being.
The evidence at the hearing established that the children spent their entire lives in the Hasidic community, they attend Hasidic schools, and their extended families are Hasidic. The weight of the evidence demonstrated that it was in the children’s best interests to continue to permit the father to exercise final decision-making authority over the children’s education and to continue to permit him to require the children to practice full religious observance in accordance with the Hasidic practices of ultra Orthodoxy while they are in his custody, or in the custody of a school that requires adherence to such practices. It directed the mother to make all reasonable efforts to ensure that the children’s appearance and conduct comply with the Hasidic religious requirements of the father and of the children’s schools while the children are in the physical custody of their father or their respective schools.
Parties May Chart Their Own Litigation Course by Agreement Which Courts Are Bound to Enforce. Waiver of Physician-patient Privilege in Contesting Custody Requires Showing That Resolution of Custody Issue Requires Revelation of Protected Material
In Bruzzese v Bruzzese, --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2017 WL 2961475, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 05579 (2d Dept., 2017) the plaintiff commenced an action for a divorce, and the defendant counterclaimed for a divorce. Prior to trial, the parties stipulated to a divorce on the ground of an irretrievable breakdown of the marital relationship pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170(7). After a nonjury trial, the Supreme Court, inter alia, awarded the defendant a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. The Appellate Division held that Supreme Court erred in awarding the defendant a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. "Parties by their stipulations may in many ways make the law for any legal proceeding to which they are parties, which not only binds them, but which the courts are bound to enforce" (Matter of New York, Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co., 98 N.Y. 447, 453). There was no showing of cause sufficient to invalidate the parties' stipulation to a divorce on the ground of an irretrievable breakdown of the marital relationship. Accordingly, the court should have awarded the defendant a divorce on this ground.
The Appellate Division found, inter alia, that the Supreme Court, relying on the physician-patient privilege, improperly precluded testimony of two witnesses who were doctors, regarding the defendant's mental health. It noted that in a matrimonial action, a party waives the physician-patient privilege concerning his or her mental or physical condition by actively contesting custody. However, there "first must be a showing beyond mere conclusory statements that resolution of the custody issue requires revelation of the protected material" (McDonald v. McDonald, 196 A.D.2d 7, 13; see Baecher v. Baecher, 58 A.D.2d 821). Since the defendant actively contested custody, and the plaintiff made the requisite showing that resolution of the custody issue required revelation of the protected material, the court should not have precluded the testimony of the doctors regarding the defendant's mental health.
Authors note: In McDonald v. McDonald, 196 A.D.2d 7, 13 (2d Dept.,1994) the Second Department adopted the requirement of Perry v Fiumano, 61 AD2d 512, 519 that before the court may find that there has been a waiver of the physician-patient privilege "[t]here first must be a showing beyond 'mere conclusory statements' that resolution of the custody issue requires revelation of the protected material" (Perry v Fiumano, 61 AD2d 512, 519).
Where Stipulation Fails to Identify Who Submits QDRO it Is Generally the Responsibility of the Party Seeking Approval of QDRO
In Scheriff v Scheriff, --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2017 WL 3044528, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 05760 (2d Dept., 2017) the parties stipulation provided that the defendant was entitled to 50% of the marital portion of the plaintiff’s pension and that the parties were to cooperate with each other in obtaining a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) to divide the pension, that they would equally share the cost of preparing the QDRO, and that the defendant’s share would be determined pursuant to the formula set forth in Majauskas v. Majauskas (61 N.Y.2d 481). The defendant moved, inter alia, “for a set-off against plaintiff’s entitlement to his equity share of the former marital home in an amount equal to all monies owed for QDRO arrears. Supreme Court denied the motion and directed the defendant to prepare and submit “an appropriate Domestic Relations Order.” The Appellate Division affirmed. It observed that under the defendant was entitled to her equitable share of the plaintiff’s pension and that payment of her share was to be effectuated through the submission of a QDRO. Although the stipulation failed to identify the party who would be responsible for submitting the QDRO, “it is generally the responsibility of the party seeking approval of the QDRO to submit it to the court with notice of settlement” (Kraus v. Kraus, 131 AD3d at 101). Thus, the defendant should have prepared and submitted a proposed QDRO to the Supreme Court with a copy to the defendant’s employer. In the absence of a QDRO, there were no “QDRO arrears.”
Where Children’s Wishes Are Product of Influence AFC Justified in Advocating for a Position Contrary to Those Wishes
In Matter of Cunningham v Talbot, --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2017 WL 2977187, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 05637 2017 WL 2977187 (3d Dept., 2017) the Appellate Division held that as the evidence supported a finding that the children’s wishes were both a product of the father’s influence and “likely to result in a substantial risk of imminent, serious harm to [them],” the attorney for the children was justified in advocating for a position contrary to those wishes where the attorney for the children properly informed Supreme Court that the children had expressed a desire not to visit the mother (see 22 NYCRR 7.2[d]).
Where No Party Moved for a Change in Custody Court May Not Modify Existing Custody Order in Non-emergency Situation Absent Notice and Opportunity to Present Evidence
In Noel v Melle, --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2017 WL 2800796, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 05226 (2d Dept., 2017) the mother was awarded sole custody of the child, with visitation to the father. The father filed a violation petition alleging that the mother had violated the order by relocating with the child and by denying him visitation. After three court appearances, the matter was scheduled for a hearing. On that date, the Supreme Court denied a request by the mother to appear by telephone, and, without the father having made an application for custody of the child or the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, awarded the father custody of the child. The court also issued a warrant for the mother’s arrest. The Appellate Division reversed and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for further proceedings on the father’s violation petition. It cautioned the Supreme Court to be mindful that determining the best interest of a child is a weighty responsibility, and that it ordinarily should not make such a determination without conducting an evidentiary hearing. It held that in order to modify a consent order granting sole custody to a parent, there must be a showing of a change in circumstances such that modification is required to protect the best interests of the child’. Custody determinations should generally be made only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry. Reversal or modification of an existing custody order should not be a weapon wielded as a means of punishing a recalcitrant or contemptuous parent . Moreover, where no party has moved for a change in custody, a court may not modify an existing custody order in a non-emergency situation absent notice to the parties, and without affording the custodial parent an opportunity to present evidence and to call and cross-examine witnesses. Supreme Court improperly modified the consent order by changing custody from the mother to the father without the father having sought that relief in the petition, and without any apparent consideration of the child’s best interests (see S.L. v. J.R., 27 NY3d at 563). The court’s award of custody to the father under the circumstances of this case also was improper in light of the father’s statements during the proceedings that he did not have a steady place to live with the child and that he did not wish to make an application for custody.
Child in a Custody Matter Does Not Have “Full-party” Status and Cannot Appeal from Denial of Mothers Modification Pertion Where She Does Not Appeal.
In Matter of Lawrence v Lawrence, --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2017 WL 2604311 (Mem), 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 05023 (4th Dept., 2017) the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal taken by the Attorney for the Child representing the parties’ oldest child from an order dismissing the mother’s petition seeking modification of a custody order. Inasmuch as the mother had not taken an appeal from that order, the child, while dissatisfied with the order, cannot force the mother to litigate a petition that she has since abandoned. It held that a child in a custody matter does not have “full-party status” (Matter of McDermott v. Bale, 94 AD3d 1542, 1543), and it declined to permit the child’s desires to chart the course of litigation.
Testimonial Evidence is not sufficient to overcome marital property presumption
In Schacter v Schacter, --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2017 WL 2366242, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 04372 (1st Dept., 2017) the Appellate Division held that Plaintiff’s brief testimony that a piano was gifted to him during the marriage did not suffice to overcome the marital property presumption; thus, the court properly deemed the piano marital property to be sold and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties (see DRL § 236[B][c]; Bernard v. Bernard, 126 AD3d 658, 659 [2d Dept 2015])
Attorney for the Child Violated Ethical Duty When He Advocated for Result That Was Contrary to Child’s Expressed Wishes
In Matter of Kleinbach v Cullerton, --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2017 WL 2491351, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 04641 (4th Dept., 2017) the Appellate Division, inter alia, agreed with the father that the initial Attorney for the Child (AFC) violated his ethical duty to determine the subject child’s position and advocate zealously in support of the child’s wishes, because that AFC advocated for a result that was contrary to the child’s expressed wishes in the absence of any justification for doing so. It held that there are only two circumstances in which an AFC is authorized to substitute his or her own judgment for that of the child: ‘[w]hen the [AFC] is convinced either that the child lacks the capacity for knowing, voluntary and considered judgment, or that following the child’s wishes is likely to result in a substantial risk of imminent, serious harm to the child. (Matter of Swinson v. Dobson, 101 AD3d 1686, 1687 quoting 22 NYCRR 7.2[d] ), neither of which was present here. In addition, although an AFC should not have a particular position or decision in mind at the outset of the case before the gathering of evidence”(Matter of Carballeira v. Shumway, 273 A.D.2d 753, 756; see Matter of Brown v. Simon, 123 AD3d 1120, 1123), the initial AFC indicated during his first court appearance, before he spoke with the child or gathered evidence regarding the petitions, that he would be substituting his judgment for that of the child.
US Supreme Court Holds that Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. ___ (2015), requires that same-sex couples to civil marriage be treated “on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples”.
In Smith v. Pavan, ____U. S. ___ (2017), the petitioners were two married same-sex couples who conceived children through anonymous sperm donation. Leigh and Jana Jacobs were married in Iowa in 2010, and Terrah and Marisa Pavan were married in New Hampshire in 2011. Leigh and Terrah each gave birth to a child in Arkansas in 2015. When it came time to secure birth certificates for the newborns, each couple filled out paperwork listing both spouses as parents—Leigh and Jana in one case, Terrah and Marisa in the other. Both times, however, the Arkansas Department of Health issued certificates bearing only the birth mother’s name.
The department’s decision rested on a provision of Arkansas law, Ark. Code §20–18–401 (2014), that specifies which individuals will appear as parents on a child’s state-issued birth certificate. “For the purposes of birth registration,” that statute says, “the mother is deemed to be the woman who gives birth to the child.” §20–18–401(e). And “[i]f the mother was married at the time of either conception or birth,” the statute instructs that “the name of [her] husband shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the child.” §20–18–401(f) (1).
The Supreme Court, in a per cerium opinion observed that when a married woman gives birth in Arkansas, state law generally requires the name of the mother’s male spouse to appear on the child’s birth certificate—regardless of his biological relationship to the child. According to the Arkansas Supreme Court, Arkansas need not issue birth certificates including the female spouses of women who give birth in the State. When a married woman in Arkansas conceives a child by means of artificial insemination, the State, must list the name of her male spouse on the child’s birth certificate. See §20–18–401(f )(1); And yet state law, as interpreted by the court below, allows Arkansas officials in those very same circumstances to omit a married woman’s female spouse from her child’s birth certificate. See 505 S. W. 3d, at 177–178.
The Supreme Court pointed out that it explained in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. ___ (2015), that the Constitution entitles same-sex couples to civil marriage “on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples”. In the decision below, the Arkansas Supreme Court considered the effect of that holding on the State’s rules governing the issuance of birth certificates and held that Obergefell proscribes such disparate treatment. Because that differential treatment infringed upon Obergefell’s commitment to provide same-sex couples “the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage” the Supreme Court reversed the state court’s judgment. It concluded that Arkansas denied married same-sex couples access to the “constellation of benefits that the Stat[e] ha[s] linked to marriage.” A State may not “exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.” The petition for a writ of certiorari was granted. The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion.
New Rules and Forms Adopted for Matrimonial Actions
By Administrative Order A/O/ 100/17, 22NYCRR §202.50(b) was amended to add a new section 202.50(b)(3) requiring that every Uncontested and Contested Judgment of Divorce contain certain decretal paragraphs, including one concerning the venue where post judgment applications for modification or enforcement in Supreme Court should be brought.
The new section requires that every Uncontested and Contested Judgment of Divorce contain certain decretal paragraphs, including one concerning the venue where post judgment applications for modification or enforcement in Supreme Court should be brought. 22 NYCRR §202.50 (b) , which is effective August 1, 2017, provides as follows:
202.50. Proposed Judgments in Matrimonial Actions; Forms
* * *
(b) Approved Forms.
* * *
(3) Additional Requirement with Respect to Uncontested and Contested Judgments of Divorce. In addition to satisfying the requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subdivision, every judgment of divorce, whether uncontested or contested, shall include language substantially in accordance with the following decretal paragraphs which shall supersede any inconsistent decretal paragraphs currently required for such forms:
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Settlement Agreement entered into between the parties on the ___ day of ____, [ ] an original OR [ ] a
transcript of which is on file with this Court and incorporated herein by reference, shall survive and shall not be merged into this judgment, * and the parties are hereby directed to comply with all legally enforceable terms and conditions of said agreement as if such terms and conditions were set
forth in their entirety herein; and it is further
* In contested actions, this paragraph may read either [shall survive and shall not be merged into this judgment] or [shall not survive and shall be merged into this judgment].
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that the Supreme Court shall retain jurisdiction to hear any applications to enforce the provisions of said Settlement Agreement or to enforce or modify the provisions of this judgment, provided the court retains jurisdiction of the matter concurrently with the Family Court for the purpose of specifically enforcing, such of the
provisions of that (separation agreement) (stipulation agreement) as are capable of specific enforcement, to the extent permitted by law, and of modifying such judgment with respect to maintenance, support, custody or visitation to the extent permitted by law, or both; and it is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that any applications brought in Supreme Court to enforce the provisions of said Settlement Agreement or to enforce or modify the provisions of this judgment shall be brought in a County wherein one of the parties resides; provided that if there are minor children
of the marriage, such applications shall be brought in a county wherein one of the parties or the child or children reside, except. in the discretion of the judge, for good cause. Good cause applications shall be made by motion or order to show cause. Where the address of either party and any child or
children is unknown and not a matter of public record, or is subject to an existing confidentiality order pursuant to DRL § 254 or FCA § 154-b, such applications may be brought in the county where the judgment was entered;
and it is further
By Administrative Order A/O /99/17, 22NYCRR §202 was amended to add a new section 202.16-b addressing the submission of written applications in matrimonial actions.
The new section addresses the submission of written applications in contested matrimonial actions. The new rules contain limitations which are applicable to to the submission of papers on pendente lite applications for alimony, maintenance, counsel fees, child support, exclusive occupancy, custody and visitation unless the requirements are waived by the judge for good cause shown. Among other things, all orders to show cause and motions must be in Times New Roman, font 12 and double spaced. The supporting affidavit or affidavit in opposition or attorney affirmation in support or opposition or memorandum of law may not exceed twenty (20) pages. Any expert affidavit may not exceed eight (8) additional pages. Reply affidavits or affirmations may not exceed ten (10) pages. Surreply affidavits can only be submitted with prior court permission.
22 NYCRR 202.16 -b, which is effective July 1, 2017, provides as follows:
§202.16-b Submission of Written Applications in Contested Matrimonial
(1) Applicability. This section shall be applicable to all contested
matrimonial actions and proceedings in Supreme Court authorized by subdivision (2) of Part B of section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law.
(2) Unless otherwise expressly provided by any provision of the CPLR or other statute, and in addition to the requirements of 22 NYCRR §202.16 (k) where applicable, the following rules and limitations are required for the submission of papers on pendente lite applications for alimony, maintenance, counsel fees, child support, exclusive occupancy, custody and
visitation unless said requirements are waived by the judge for good cause shown:
(i) Applications that are deemed an emergency must comply with 22 NYCRR §202.7 and provide for notice, where applicable, in accordance with same. These emergency applications shall receive a preference by the clerk for processing and the court for signature. Designating an application as an
emergency without good cause may be punishable by the issuance of sanctions pursuant to Part 130 of the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge. Any application designated as an emergency without good cause shall be processed and considered in the ordinary course of local court procedures.
(ii) Where practicable. all orders to show cause, motions or crossmotions for relief should be made in one order to show cause or motion or cross-motion.
(iii) All orders to show cause and motions or cross motions shall be submitted on one-sided copy except as otherwise provided in 22 NYCRR §202.5(at or electronically where authorized, with one-inch margins on eight and one half by eleven (8.5 x 11) inch paper with all additional exhibits tabbed. They shall be in Times New Roman font 12 and double spaced. They must be of sufficient quality ink to allow for the reading and
proper scanning of the documents. Self-represented litigants may submit handwritten applications provided that the handwriting is legible and otherwise in conformity with these rules.
(iv) The supporting affidavit or affidavit in opposition or attorney affirmation in support or opposition or memorandum of law shall not exceed twenty (20) pages. Any expert affidavit required shall not exceed eight (8) additional pages. Any attorney affirmation in support or opposition or memorandum of law shall contain only discussion and argument on issues of law except for facts known only to the attorney. Any reply affidavits or affirmations to the extent permitted shall not exceed ten (10) pages. Surreply affidavits can only be submitted with prior court permission.
(v) Except for affidavits of net worth (pursuant to 22 NYCRR §202.16 (b)), retainer agreements (pursuant to Rule 1400.3 of the Joint Rules of the Appellate Division). maintenance guidelines worksheets and/or child support worksheets, or counsel fee billing statements or affirmations or
affidavits related to counsel fees (pursuant to Domestic Relations Law §237 and 22 NYCRR §202.16(k))' all of which may include attachments thereto, all exhibits annexed to any motion, cross motion, order to show cause, opposition or reply may not be greater than three (3) inches thick without prior permission of the court. All exhibits must contain exhibit tabs.
(vi) If the application or responsive papers exceed the page or size limitation provided in this section, counsel or the self-represented litigant must certify in good faith the need to exceed such limitation, and the court may reject or require revision of the application if the court deems the reasons insufficient.
(3) Nothing contained herein shall prevent a judge or justice of the court or of a judicial district within which the court sits from establishing local part rules to the contrary or in addition to these rules.
By Administrative Order A/O 102/17, the Uncontested Divorce Packet Forms were modified to reflect the increases as of March 1, 2017 in the Self Support Reserve to $16,281 and in the Poverty Level Income for a single person to $12,060.
First Department Affirms Award of Costs of Higher Education, Including College, for 7 Year Old Child Because it Appeared to Be an Inevitable Expense for this Child
In Klauer v Abeliovich, --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2017 WL 1450277, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 03110 (1st Dept., 2017) the parties were married in December 2008 and there was one child of the marriage, born in 2010.
The Appellate Division held that Supreme Court correctly rejected the Referee’s recommendation as to basic child support when it determined that in setting the basic child support obligation the parties’ combined income above the $141,000 statutory cap should be taken into consideration (Domestic Relations Law § 240[1–b][f] ). In deciding to utilize the parties’ combined income up to $800,000 in setting support, the court examined whether the capped support “adequately reflects a support level that meets the needs and continuation of the child[’s] lifestyle” and concluded that it did not (Beroza v. Hendler, 109 AD3d 498, 500–501 [2d Dept 2013] ).
The Appellate Division held that Supreme Court, under the circumstances, providently exercised its discretion in ordering that the husband pay 20% of the child’s educational expenses, including college, until the child attains age 21 (see Cimons v. Cimons, 53 AD3d 125, 131 [2d Dept 2008] ). The court took into consideration several factors, including the high educational achievements of both parties and their professions. Plaintiff, a financial analyst, has a B.A. from Georgetown and an MBA from Columbia Business School; she also holds series 3 and 7 licenses. Defendant, an associate professor of medicine at Columbia University Medical School, has a B.A. from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a M.D./Ph.D. from Harvard. During the marriage the parties agreed the child would be privately educated and their enrollment of the child in a private nursery school when he was only nine months old reflects their agreement. There was no indication that defendant could not afford to pay his share of private school tuition, and his argument that the child was too young for the court to have addressed higher education issues does not warrant modification of Supreme Court’s order. There was no reason to delay resolution of the issue of higher education, including college, because it appeared to be an inevitable expense for this child, given the parties’ apparent commitment to an enriched education, the parties’ means and their high level of educational achievements. It affirmed the award because it was not an improvident exercise of the court’s discretion.
The Appellate Division held that absent an agreement to the contrary, or without engaging in a proper analysis under the paragraph “(f)” factors of the Domestic Relations Law, the court should not have ordered defendant to pay for summer and/or extracurricular activities (Domestic Relations Law § 240[1–b][f]; Michael J.D., 138 AD3d at 154). Unlike health care and child care expenses, these “add-on” expenses are not separately enumerated under the CSSA and it is usually anticipated that they will be paid from the basic child support award ordered by the court. Furthermore, without explaining why, Supreme Court allocated these add-ons in the same manner it allocated educational expenses (i.e. 20% to defendant as opposed to 10.5%). Because the court made its determination before the Court’s decision in Michael J.D., where it clarified how these add-ons should be analyzed and separately justified under paragraph (f), it remitted to Supreme Court the issue of how summer and/or any other extracurricular activities not specifically agreed to by the parties will be allocated between them, if at all.
The Appellate Division modified to eliminate the award of the separate property credit to plaintiff in the amount of $350,000 and otherwise affirm Supreme Court’s denial of any further separate property credit to plaintiff in the amount of $932,000 for payments toward the principal and/or renovation costs of their Fifth Avenue coop. It held that Plaintiff was not entitled to a separate property credit for the $350,000 downpayment or the additional sum of $932,000 the parties applied towards the purchase price of the Fifth Avenue coop. The conveyance of separate funds under these circumstances resulted in the separate assets becoming presumptively marital and partial use of separate funds to acquire a marital asset does not mandate that plaintiff be credited for any separate funds she committed (see Fields, 15 NY3d at 167).
The Appellate Division held that the court correctly determined that plaintiff’s bonus, although paid after the action was commenced, was compensation for her past performance, not tied to future performance (see DeJesus v. DeJesus, 90 N.Y.2d 643, 652  ). As a general rule, bonuses paid as compensation for past services are marital property and subject to equitable distribution (see Ropiecki v. Ropiecki, 94 AD3d 734, 736 [2d Dept 2012] ). The court properly prorated the bonus to reflect that although it was paid for the 2011 calendar year, the parties separated in May 2011, meaning only 40% of the total amount could be considered marital.
The Appellate Division held that while it was a provident exercise of the court’s discretion to permit plaintiff to make payments to defendant of his distributive share of the marital assets in installments, post-decision interest is mandatory on the distributive award pursuant to CPLR 5002, and should be awarded (see Moyal v. Moyal, 85 AD3d 614, 615 [1st Dept 2011] ).
First Department Holds That Invoices Standing Alone May Not Be Regarded as Evidence of Title or Ownership of Property.
In Anonymous v. Anonymous,--- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2017 WL 1234201, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 02613 (1st Dept., 2017) the parties prenuptial agreement did not specifically address how the parties should divide their art collection upon dissolution of the marriage. It provided that any property owned on the date of execution of the prenuptial agreement, April 21, 1992, or "hereafter…acquired" by one party remains that party's separate property. It provided that "[n]o contribution of either party to the care, maintenance, improvement, custody or repair of… [the other's party]…shall in any way alter or convert any of such property…to marital property. The prenuptial agreement further provided that "any property acquired after the date of the marriage that is jointly held in the names of both parties" shall, upon dissolution of the marriage — which occurred on March 25, 2014 — be divided equally between the parties. Under the heading, Non-Marital Property, the agreement provided: "No property hereafter acquired by the parties or by either of them…shall constitute marital property…unless (a) pursuant to a subscribed and acknowledged written agreement, the parties expressly designate said property as marital property…or (b) title to said property is jointly held in the names of both parties." During the marriage, the parties agreed to acquire certain art as a joint collection, including pieces acquired through Art Advisory Services, Luhring Augustine, and The Kitchen. The husband moved, inter alia, for a declaratory judgment that, "consistent with the Prenuptial Agreement, the title to the art purchased during the marriage determines whether it is marital or separate property, regardless of the source of funds used to acquire it or the alleged intent behind the purchase." He argued that title should be determined based solely on the invoice or bill of sale. The motion court relied on the invoices as proof of whether the art was jointly or individually held in granting his motion.
The Appellate Division held to the contrary, that invoices, standing alone, may not be regarded as evidence of title or ownership of the art. An invoice is defined as "[a] list of goods sent or services provided, with a statement of the sum due for these" . "An invoice…is not a bill of sale, nor is it evidence of a sale. It is a mere detailed statement of the nature, quantity, or cost of the goods, or price of the things invoiced, and it is as appropriate to a bailment as a sale. Hence, standing alone, it is never regarded as “evidence of title" (Sturm v. Boker, 150 US 312, 328 . An invoice cannot be said to be dispositive of ownership. The purpose of the invoice is not to identify the titled owner. The unreliability of an invoice as sole proof of title was evidenced by various invoices in the record. The Appellate Division concluded that title to personalty cannot be determined by relying solely upon an invoice. In determining title to the artwork in question, all the facts and circumstances of the acquisition and indicia of ownership must also be considered. Accordingly, the order was reversed, on the law, the declaration vacated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings, including discovery and an evidentiary hearing to determine the ownership of the disputed art.
Third Department Holds That Failure to Effectuate Proper Service of a Motion Deprives the Court of Jurisdiction to Entertain the Motion
In Matter of Gariel v Morse, --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2016 WL 7469484 (Mem), 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 08921 (3d Dept., 2016) the Appellate Division held that the father’s letter to the court had to be treated as a motion for voluntary discontinuance pursuant to CPLR 3217(b) (see Family Ct Act § 165[a]) and, as such, it had to comply with the applicable service requirements. Inasmuch as the father’s failure to effectuate proper service “deprive[d] the court of jurisdiction to entertain the motion”(Lee v. I–Sheng Li, 129 AD3d 923, 923 ; see Matter of Lydia DD., 94 AD3d at 1386; Bianco v. LiGreci, 298 A.D.2d 482, 482 ; Adames v. New York City Tr. Auth., 126 A.D.2d 462, 462 ; Burstin v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 98 A.D.2d 928, 929  ), it found that Family Court erred in dismissing the petition.
Second Department Holds that Party Seeking Counsel Fees Must Demonstrate, Prima Facie, Attorney Substantially Complied with 22 NYCRR 1400.2 and 1400.3
In Piza v Baez-Piza, --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2016 WL 7224738, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 08384 (2d Dept.,2016) following a trial, the defendant sought additional attorney’s fees, and, the Supreme Court, inter alia, awarded the defendant the sum of $7,500 in attorney’s fees for legal services provided following the earlier award of $3,500 in attorney’s fees. The Appellate Division held that Supreme Court erred in awarding the defendant total attorney’s fees in excess of the $7,500 retainer that she paid to her attorney, as she did not demonstrate, prima facie, that her attorney substantially complied with 22 NYCRR 1400.2 and 1400.3 (see Vitale v. Vitale, 112 AD3d 614, 615). It modified the judgment to provide that the additional award of attorney’s fees for legal services provided following the prior award of $3,500 be limited to the sum of $4,000 (see Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 285 A.D.2d 587, 588–589).
Appellate Division Considers Factor  “the existence and duration of a pre-marital joint household in awarding Maintenance
In Kaprov v Stalinsky, --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2016 WL 7380951, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 08509 (2d Dept., 2016) the husband argued, inter alia, that as the Supreme Court had already ordered him to pay, pursuant to a pendente lite order, $3,000 per month in temporary maintenance retroactive to November 12, 2010, the date on which the wife filed her complaint seeking a divorce, the Court, in awarding maintenance for seven years from the date of judgment this effectively granted the wife an 11–year maintenance award, which is excessive in duration given that the marriage lasted only 12 years and the parties had no children together. The Appellate Division rejected this argument observing that a party’s maintenance obligation is retroactive to the date the application for maintenance was first made (see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][a] ). However, the party is also entitled to a credit for any amount of temporary maintenance ... already paid” (Huffman v. Huffman, 84 AD3d 875, 876). In arguing that the maintenance award was out of proportion to the duration of the marriage, the husband failed to recognize that, pursuant to the version of Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(6)(a) in effect at the time of the commencement of this action, one of the factors a court should take into account in deciding the amount and duration of a maintenance award is “the existence and duration of a pre-marital joint household” (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][a] ). The wife testified that the couple lived together from 1984 to 2010, approximately 26 years. Thus, an 11–year award of maintenance was not out of proportion with the duration of the joint household. The maintenance award was appropriate for the wife to become self-supporting given the factors involved, including the duration of the pre-marital joint household, as well as the wife’s age, absence from the workforce, reduced earning capacity, and limited education (see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][a] ).
2017 Child Support Standards Chart Released
The 2017 combined parental income cap is $143,000. The 2017 self-support reserve is $16,281 and the poverty income guidelines amount for a single person is $12,060. See https://www.childsupport.ny.gov/child_support_standards.html (last accessed March 31, 2017). The child support standards chart, released March 17, 2017 is available at https://www.childsupport.ny.gov/dcse/pdfs/CSSA.pdf (last accessed March 31, 2017).
Appellate Division Holds Postnuptial Agreement Which Was Not Properly Acknowledged as Required by Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(3) Was Ratified by Accepting its Benefits
In Gardella v Remizov, --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2016 WL 6885860, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 07924 (2d Dept., 2016) the parties to this matrimonial action were married in 2000. In October 2002, the parties entered into a postnuptial agreement, which provided, among other things, that the marital residence and the plaintiff’s private medical practice were the plaintiff’s separate property. In 2006, the parties entered into a second postnuptial agreement, which provided that four parcels of real property in Florida acquired by the parties during the marriage had been purchased with the plaintiff’s separate property, and further addressed the distribution of those four parcels in the event of a divorce. In 2010, the parties entered into a separation agreement, which addressed, inter alia, issues of maintenance and equitable distribution of the parties’ respective assets. At the time, the plaintiff, a neurologist, was earning approximately $600,000 per year, and the defendant, a wine salesman, was earning approximately $40,000. The separation agreement provided, among other things, that the defendant would have no interest in any of the assets acquired during the parties’ marriage, including six parcels of real property, the plaintiff’s partnership interest in a neurological practice, and the plaintiff’s bank and brokerage accounts, and that he waived his right to spousal maintenance. The defendant was not represented by counsel when he executed the separation agreement. In November 2011, the plaintiff commenced the action for a divorce. Supreme Court granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment dismissing the defendant’s counterclaims to set aside the agreement, and denied defendants cross motion for summary judgment on his counterclaims to set aside the agreements, to nullify the 2002 postnuptial agreement for lack of acknowledgment, and for financial disclosure. The Appellate Division found that given the vast disparity in the parties’ earnings, the evidence that the defendant had no assets of value, and the defendant’s documented medical condition which inhibits his future earning capacity, the defendant’s submissions were sufficient to create an inference that the separation agreement was unconscionable. In addition, the defendant’s evidence indicating that the plaintiff sold almost $1 million in securities in the months preceding his execution of the separation agreement, the value of which were not accounted for in the list of her bank and brokerage accounts therein, raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff concealed assets. It held that under these circumstances, the Supreme Court should have exercised its equitable powers and directed further financial disclosure, to be followed by a hearing to test the validity of the separation agreement.
The Appellate Division further found, that the 2006 agreement was valid, and that while the defendant correctly contended that the 2002 postnuptial agreement was not properly acknowledged in the manner required by Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(3) (see Galetta v. Galetta, 21 NY3d 186, 192), the evidence established that the defendant ratified that agreement by accepting the benefits of it and by waiting more than eight years to seek its nullification. No inquiry into the validity of the 2002 postnuptial agreement or the 2006 postnuptial agreement would be necessary or warranted.
Parent Who Obtains Order Compelling Another Person to Pay Child Support Will Be Judicially Estopped from Taking Inconsistent Position That Other Person Was Not a Parent to the Child for Purposes of Visitation
In Paese v Paese, --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2016 WL 6604674, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 07304 (2d Dept.,2016) the defendant had three children from prior relationships, including the subject child. The plaintiff moved in with the defendant and her children and raised the subject child as his daughter. The plaintiff and the defendant later married and then separated. After the separation, the defendant filed a petition in the Family Court seeking child support from the plaintiff for all of her children, including the subject child. A Support Magistrate found that the plaintiff was chargeable with the support of the subject child and his two biological children, and directed him to pay child support and contribute to child care expenses. In May 2013, the plaintiff commenced an action for a divorce. The Supreme Court consolidated the Family Court proceeding with the Supreme Court action and issued a temporary access order pursuant to which the plaintiff had access to the subject child and his biological children. In January 2015, the defendant moved, inter alia, to remove the subject child from the temporary access order, declare the plaintiff a third-party stranger to the subject child. Supreme Court denied the motion, determining that the defendant was judicially estopped from arguing that the plaintiff was not the subject child’s parent for the purpose of visitation because she previously sought and obtained an award of child support for the child. During the trial, when asked about the order denying her motion to remove the subject child from the temporary access order, the defendant testified that she did not agree with the order because, among other things, she did not believe that the plaintiff should be paying support for the subject child. The trial was to resume several weeks later, at which time the Supreme Court informed the parties that based on the defendant’s clear and unequivocal waiver of child support for the subject child, the court would not direct the plaintiff to pay child support for the subject child, which was the sole basis of its judicial estoppel ruling. Therefore, the court ruled, the plaintiff did not have standing to seek visitation, his request for access to the subject child was denied, and there was no need to complete the trial with respect to visitation. The court issued an order accordingly.
The Appellate Division reversed and remitted for completion of the trial with respect to visitation. It observed that one way that an individual may obtain standing to proceed as a “parent” is through the doctrine of judicial estoppel (see Matter of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A. C.C., 28 NY3d 1). Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, “a party who assumes a certain position in a prior legal proceeding and secures a favorable judgment therein is precluded from assuming a contrary position in another action simply because his or her interests have changed”. Thus, where a parent obtains an order compelling another person to pay child support based on the parent’s successful argument that the other person was a parent to the child, the parent who obtained child support will be judicially estopped from taking the inconsistent position that the other person was not, in fact, a parent to the child for purposes of visitation. It held that Supreme Court erred in finding that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek visitation with the subject child. The defendant was judicially estopped from arguing that the plaintiff was not a parent for the purpose of visitation. First, by asserting in her child support petition that the plaintiff was chargeable with support for the subject child, the plaintiff assumed the position before the Family Court that the plaintiff was the subject child’s parent, as it is parents who are chargeable with the support of their children ( Family Ct Act § 413[a] ). Next, based on her assertion that the plaintiff was chargeable with the subject child’s support, the defendant successfully obtained an order compelling the plaintiff to pay child support for the subject child. Under this order, the plaintiff was required to pay child support for his children, including the subject child. Furthermore, the record did not support the court’s finding that the defendant unequivocally waived the right to child support. Therefore, the defendant was judicially estopped from arguing that the plaintiff is not a parent for the purpose of visitation.
Net Worth Affidavit Form Revised Effective August 1, 2016
The Affidavit of Net Worth Form which is required to be served by both parties, pursuant to DRL §236 [B]  and 22 NYCRR §202.16(b), was revised effective August 1, 2016. The new form, which is gender neutral, includes new categories of expenses and removes certain expense categories. The most significant change is that it requires that the value of assets and the amount of liabilities and debts shall be listed as of “date of commencement” of the action in addition to the “current amount.”
Other significant changes in the form include new sections under “Liabilities“ for “Credit Card Debt” and “Home Equity and Other Lines of Credit;” former Item VII, Support Requirements, was removed; and former item VIII Counsel Fees was removed and replaced with the following:
“VII. LEGAL & EXPERT FEES
Please state the amount you have paid to all lawyers and experts retained in connection with your marital dissolution, including name of professional, amounts and dates paid, and source of funds. Attach retainer agreement for your present
The parties are now required to indicate if the net worth statement is not the first one they have filed. The following language appears at the end of the form:
“This is the _______ Statement of Net Worth I have filed in this proceeding.”
It appears that item 12.1 Contingent Interests (stock options, interests subject to life estates, prospective inheritances) contains a confusing typographical error. It requires the affiant to list "g. source of acquisition to acquire. ” However, it is clear from the balance of the assets portion of the form that this was meant to read “Source of funds to acquire”, a term used throughout the form.
The Net Worth Affidavit form can be downloaded in pdf, word and fillable format from http://www.nycourts.gov/divorce/forms.shtml
Preliminary Conference Stipulation/Order Form Revised Effective August 1, 2016
The Preliminary Conference Stipulation/Order form required to be served pursuant to 22 NYCRR §202.16(f) was revised effective August 1, 2016. It was re-formatted and contains new provisions related to the post-divorce maintenance guidelines and notice of the automatic orders.
DRL §236 [B]  [g], which is applicable in actions commenced on or after January 25, 2016 (Laws of 2015, Ch 269) provides that where either or both parties are unrepresented, the court shall not enter a maintenance order or judgment unless the court informs the unrepresented party or parties of the post-divorce maintenance guideline obligation. Subdivision M. titled “NOTICE OF GUIDELINE MAINTENANCE” contains a notice intended to comply with DRL §236 [B]  [g], in cases where there is an unrepresented party. The Notice advises the parties that under the Maintenance Guidelines Law there is an obligation to award the guideline amount of maintenance on income up to $178,000 to be paid by the party with the higher income (the maintenance payor) to the party with the lower income (the maintenance payee) according to a formula, unless the parties agree otherwise or waive this right.
The new form contains a new Subdivision J titled AUTOMATIC STATUTORY RESTRAINTS ( DRL §236[B]), in which each party acknowledges that he or she has received a copy of the Automatic Statutory Restraints/Automatic Orders required by DRL §236[B], and that he or she understands that he or she is bound by those Restraints/Orders during the pendency of this action, unless terminated, modified, or amended by order of the Court upon motion of either party or upon written agreement between the parties duly executed and acknowledged.
The other significant changes in the form are as follows:
BACKGROUND INFORMATION, was moved to Item A, at the beginning of the form and the information formerly at the beginning of the form was moved into item A.5. That part of Item A which requires the parties to identify and state the nature of any premarital, marital, separation and other agreements was modified to add “and/or Orders which affect the rights of either of the parties in this action.” Like the former preliminary conference statement it also contains a space to include a date for either party to “challenge the agreement”. However, unlike the former form, the new form contains a a waiver provision which specifies that if “No challenge is asserted by that date, it is waived unless good cause is shown.”
Subdivision B GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE (1-3) contains spaces for the parties to insert the dates the pleadings were served or will be served. Subdivision B (4) which is where the parties indicate that the issue of grounds “is unresolved” was modified to remove “a jury is or is not required”. In the new form Subdivision B (4) specifies that if “the issue of grounds is resolved, the parties agree that Plaintiff/Defendant will proceed on an uncontested basis to obtain a divorce on the grounds of DRL § 170(7) and the parties waive the right to serve a Notice to Discontinue pursuant to CPLR 3217(a) unless on consent of the parties.”
That part of former Subdivision C, which stated that “The issue of custody is resolved __ unresolved__” was removed from the form, and the references to a “parenting plan” in the event custody issues are resolved or unresolved were removed.
The following was added to Subdivision C CUSTODY, as (3):
ATTORNEY FOR CHILD(REN) or GUARDIAN AD LITEM: Subject to judicial approval, the parties request that the Court appoint an Attorney for the parties’ minor child(ren) (“AFC”). The cost of the AFC’s services shall be paid as follows: _________________________________________________________ .
FORENSIC: Subject to judicial approval, the parties request that the Court appoint a neutral forensic expert to conduct a custody/parental access evaluation of the parties and their child(ren). Subject to Judicial approval, the cost of the forensic evaluation shall be paid as follows:______________________________.
The following was added to Subdivision D FINANCIAL: “(4) Counsel Fees are resolved unresolved.”
Subdivision G. (1) titled Preservation of Evidence was modified to add the requirement that a party shall maintain not only all financial records in his or her possession but all financial records “under his or her control” through the date of the entry of a judgment of divorce.
Subdivision G (2) titled Document Production was also modified to remove the 45 day period to exchange records and require the exchange of checking account, brokerage account and savings account records for both “joint and individual accounts.”
The following language was removed from Subdivision G: “Any costs associated with the use of the authorization shall be paid by _____OR reserved for the Court once the amount is determined.
No later than ________, the parties shall notify the Court of all items to be provided
above that have not been provided.
Spaces were added to Subdivision G (2) for the parties to list the dates for both parties to respond to notices of discovery and inspection, and interrogatories.
Spaces that were in the former preliminary conference order for the parties to list the dates that party depositions and third party depositions were to be completed have been removed.
“Compliance with discovery demands shall be on a timely basis pursuant to the CPLR “ was removed from Subdivision G.
Subdivision H, VALUATION/FINANCIAL was re-written but is substantially the same as in the former form.
The checklist for assets requiring valuation in former Item 1 was removed as well as the sentence :” The date of valuation be ___________for items___________and shall be the date of commencement of this action for items_________________ .”
The words “no later than_____” were removed from the following sentence in Item 1: ‘If a party requires fees to retain an expert and the parties cannot agree upon the source of the funds, an application for fees shall be made.”
The time limitations for the exchange of expert reports in Item 2, Experts to be Retained by a Party, where there is no date specified, was modified to extend the time to exchange expert reports: “Absent any date specified, they are to be exchanged 60 days prior to trial or” 30 days after receipt of the report of the neutral expert, whichever is later.”
Subdivision I, ” Confidentiality/Non-Disclosure Agreement “ which appeared in the former form, was removed.
Finally, the following was added to subdivision N: “All discovery as set forth herein above is expected to be completed prior to the compliance conference.”
The Preliminary Conference form can be downloaded in pdf, word and fillable format from http://www.nycourts.gov/divorce/forms.shtml
Court of Appeals Holds Where Party Represented by Counsel Family Court Objections Must Be Served Upon Him.
In Matter of Odunbaku v Odunbaku, 2016 NY Slip Op 07705 (2016) the Court of Appeals held that if a party is represented by counsel, the time requirements set out in Family Court Act § 439 (e) for objections to a support magistrate's final order, when the order is served by mail, do not begin to run until the order is mailed to counsel.
The mother retained Staten Island Legal Services to represent her in her efforts to obtain child support from respondent father, with whom she had a son. Through counsel, who represented her throughout the proceedings she obtained a support order. Subsequently a different support magistrate granted the father's petition for downward modification and reduced the father's child support obligation. The order and findings, dated July 24, 2013, was mailed by the Clerk of Family Court directly to the father and to the mother, but not to the father's lawyer or the mother's lawyer. On September 3, 2013, 41 days after the orders were mailed, the mother, through counsel, filed objections. Family Court denied the bjections as untimely, relying on Family Court Act § 439 (e), which provides that "[s]pecific written objections to a final order of a support magistrate may be filed by either party with the court within thirty days after receipt of the order in court or by personal service, or, if the objecting party or parties did not receive the order in court or by personal service, thirty-five days after mailing of the order to such party or parties" (emphasis added). The Court ruled that "the mailing of a copy of the order and findings of fact to a party of the proceedings satisfied the requirements of § 439 (e) and [22 NYCRR] 205.36 (b)" and that "neither the Family Court Act nor [22 NYCRR 205.36 (b)] specifically requires that the Clerk of Court shall mail a copy of the Support Magistrate's order and decision to a party's attorney."
The mother appealed relying on Matter of Bianca v Frank (43 NY2d 168 ). The Appellate Division affirmed relying on 22 NYCRR 205.36 (b) which provides that "[a]t the time of the entry of the order of support, the clerk of [Family Court] shall cause a copy of the findings of fact and order of support to be served either in person or by mail upon the parties to the proceeding or their attorneys."
The Court of Appeals reversed holding that Matter of Bianca v Frank was dispositive. There, it held that once counsel has appeared in a matter a Statute of Limitations or time requirement cannot begin to run unless that counsel is served with the determination or the order or judgment sought to be reviewed". The Bianca Court recognized that this principle would not apply if a legislative enactment specifically excluded the necessity of serving counsel by stating the legislative "intention to depart from the standard practice . . . in unmistakable terms" . The Court noted that the rationale of Bianca is straightforward. "[O]nce a party chooses to be represented by counsel in an action or proceeding, whether administrative or judicial, the attorney is deemed to act as his agent in all respects relevant to the proceeding. Thus any documents, particularly those purporting to have legal effect on the proceeding, should be served on the attorney the party has chosen to handle the matter on his behalf.”
The Court held that Bianca governed and the reference to the mailing of the order to a "party or parties" in Family Court Act § 439 (e) must be read to require that the order be mailed to the party's counsel, in order for the statutory time requirement to commence. While section 439 (e) uses the term "party," the statute does not convey in language that could not be mistaken that mailing to a represented party is dispositive for time requirement purposes and mailing to counsel is unnecessary, notwithstanding Bianca.
Court of Appeals overrules it Holding in Matter of Alison D and it's Definition of "Parent" for Purposes of Custody and Visitation.
In Matter of Brooke S.B., v Elizabeth A. C.C., two related cases, the Court of Appeals revisited Matter of Alison D. v Virginia M. (77 NY2d 651 ) which held that in an unmarried couple, a partner without a biological or adoptive relation to a child is not that child's "parent" for purposes of standing to seek custody or visitation under Domestic Relations Law § 70 (a), notwithstanding their "established relationship with the child". The Court of Appeals agreed that the Petitioners in these cases, who similarly lacked any biological or adoptive connection to the children, should have standing to seek custody and visitation pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 70 (a) in light of more recently delineated legal principles, which required it to conclude that that definition of "parent" established by it in Alison D. has become unworkable when applied to increasingly varied familial relationships. The Court, in an opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam overruled Alison D. and held that where a partner shows by clear and convincing evidence that the parties agreed to conceive a child and to raise the child together, the non-biological, non-adoptive partner has standing to seek visitation and custody under Domestic Relations Law § 70.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the petitioners had argued that its holding that Domestic Relations Law § 70 permits a non-biological, non-adoptive parent to achieve standing to petition for custody and visitation requires it to specify the limited circumstances in which such a person has standing as a "parent" under Domestic Relations Law § 70. It observed that because of the fundamental rights to which biological and adoptive parents are entitled, any encroachment on the rights of such parents and, especially, any test to expand who is a parent, must be appropriately narrow. It rejected the premise that it must now declare that one test would be appropriate for all situations, or that the competing tests proffered by Petitioners and amici were the only options that should be considered. It noted that the Petitioners had alleged in both cases before it that the parties entered into a pre-conception agreement to conceive and raise a child as co-parents. It held that these allegations, if proven by clear and convincing evidence, were sufficient to establish standing. Because it decided these cases based on the facts presented to it, it was premature for the Court to consider adopting a test for situations in which a couple did not enter into a pre-conception agreement. The Court specified that it did not decide whether, in a case where a biological or adoptive parent consented to the creation of a parent-like relationship between his or her partner and child after conception, the partner can establish standing to seek visitation and custody. Inasmuch as the conception test applied here, it did not opine on the proper test, if any, to be applied in situations in which a couple has not entered into a pre-conception agreement. It merely concluded that, where a petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has agreed with the biological parent of the child to conceive and raise the child as co-parents, the petitioner has presented sufficient evidence to achieve standing to seek custody and visitation of the child. Whether a partner without such an agreement can establish standing and if so, what factors a petitioner must establish to achieve standing based on equitable estoppel was a matter left for another day, upon a different record. The Court stressed that its decision addressed only the ability of a person to establish standing as a parent to petition for custody or visitation; the ultimate determination of whether those rights shall be granted rests in the sound discretion of the court, which will determine the best interests of the child.
First Department Holds That To Be Valid So-Ordered Stipulation Fixing Temporary Maintenance Must Comply With Domestic Relations Law Former § 236(B)(5–a)(f)
In Anonymous v Anonymous, 2016 WL 4131751 (1st Dept.,2016) Plaintiff commenced the action for divorce in June 2011. On October 5, 2011, the parties signed a preliminary conference stipulation, which was so-ordered by the court, which directed defendant to pay temporary maintenance of $250 per week, plaintiff’s cell phone expenses up to 1,000 minutes, all fixed and other household expenses, and all costs of the child, including but not limited to private nursery school tuition and health costs.
The wife moved for an upward modification of maintenance based upon documentation she had subpoenad showing that the husbands income was greater than he had indicated. The motion court concluded that the PC order was unenforceable, because it did not state that the parties were advised of the temporary maintenance calculations under Domestic Relations Law former § 236(B)(5–a), did not state the presumptive amount pursuant to that calculation, and did not state the reason for deviating from that amount. It determined that the entire stipulation was invalid, because its remaining financial terms were intertwined with the temporary maintenance terms. The court next calculated the appropriate temporary maintenance, applying the formula set forth in the DRL, which is based on the parties’ gross income. Defendant had also submitted a letter from his accountant estimating his 2014 income at $300,000 and the court deemed defendant’s income to be $300,000 for the purposes of calculating temporary maintenance. The court concluded that defendant should pay plaintiff temporary maintenance in the sum of $7,500 per month, retroactive to the date of plaintiff’s motion. The court clarified that that sum was intended to cover all of plaintiff’s reasonable expenses, including housing; thus, the court did not order defendant to pay any expenses to third parties on plaintiff’s behalf, such as the maintenance fees on the marital apartment, which he had been paying. The Appellate Division affirmed. It held that the preliminary conference stipulation was invalid as a matter of law, because it failed to comply with the requirements of Domestic Relations Law former § 236(B)(5–a)(f). That statute required that, where, as here, a “validly executed agreement or stipulation voluntarily entered into between the parties in an action commenced [on or after October 13, 2010] ... deviates from the presumptive award of temporary maintenance, the agreement or stipulation must specify the amount that such presumptive award of temporary maintenance would have been and the reason or reasons that such agreement or stipulation does not provide for payment of that amount” (former Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5–a][f] ). This provision of the statute “may not be waived by either party or counsel” and because the remaining terms of the PC order were intertwined with the temporary maintenance terms, the entire order was invalid.
Court of Appeals Rejects "adequate relevant information standard" applied by the Courts in Custody Cases
In S.L. v J.R., ___NY3d ___, 2016 NY Slip Op 04442 (2016) the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Garcia, reversed an order of the Appellate Division, which affirmed Supreme Court's decision in a custody case not to conduct an evidentiary hearing based on its determination that the court possessed "adequate relevant information to enable it to make an informed and provident determination as to the child's best interest." The Court rejected the “undefined and imprecise” adequate relevant information" standard applied by the courts below which tolerates an unacceptably-high risk of yielding custody determinations that do not conform to the best interest of a child nor adequately protect a parent whose fundamental right, the right to control the upbringing of a child, hangs in the balance. The Court observed that in rendering a final custody award without a hearing, Supreme Court appeared to rely on, among other things, hearsay statements and the conclusion of a court-appointed forensic evaluator whose opinions and credibility were untested by either party. It pointed out that a decision regarding child custody should be based on admissible evidence, and there was no indication that a "best interest" determination was ever made based on anything more reliable than mere "information." Moreover, while Supreme Court purported to rely on allegations that were "not controverted," the affidavit filed by Mother plainly called into question or sought to explain the circumstances surrounding many of the alleged "incidents of disturbing behavior." The Court of Appeals held that these circumstances do not fit within the narrow exception to the general right to a hearing. It reaffirmed the principle that, as a general matter, custody determinations should be rendered only after a full and plenary hearing. It declined, to fashion a "one size fits all" rule mandating a hearing in every custody case statewide. However, where, as here, facts material to the best interest analysis, and the circumstances surrounding such facts, remain in dispute, a custody hearing is required. Significantly, the Court held that “ a court opting to forego a plenary hearing must take care to clearly articulate which factors were, or were not, material to its determination, and the evidence supporting its decision.” Under the circumstances of this case, a plenary hearing was necessary.
Court of Appeals Holds Consecutive Commitments are Authorized by Family Court Act § 454(3)
In Matter of Columbia County Support Collection Unit, v. Risley, 2016 WL 3147588 (2016) the Court of Appeals held that Family Court, in revoking two prior suspended orders of commitment, was authorized to order consecutive six-month sentences for each to run consecutively with a third six-month sentence imposed for a current violation. The Court, in an opinion by Judge Garcia, observed that Family Court is empowered “to use any or all enforcement powers in every proceeding brought for violation of a court order” of support (Family Ct Act § 454 ). Such powers include the authority to sentence willfully non-compliant parents to jail “for a term not to exceed six months [,]” but also to suspend such orders of commitment when appropriate (see Family Ct Act §§ 454[a], 455 ). The Appellate Division rejected the contention that consecutive commitments were not authorized by Family Court Act § 454(3) and concluded that “[g]iven the father’s failure to contest the amounts due and his willful refusal to voluntarily pay them despite repeated opportunities afforded to him over more than three years, we find no abuse of discretion in the determination to run the sentences consecutively” (122 AD3d 1097, 1098 [3d Dept 2014] ). The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division and affirmed its order.
Support Forms Updated March 1, 2016 For Maintenance and Child Support Applications
Form UD-8(1) Annual Income Worksheet
Form UD-8(2) Maintenance Guidelines Worksheet
Form UD-8(3) Child Support Worksheet
Post-Divorce Maintenance/Child Support Worksheet
Temporary Maintenance Worksheet (for divorces started on or after 10/25/15)
Temporary Maintenance Worksheet (for divorces started before 10/25/15)
Court of Appeals Holds That Consent to Record Conversation of Child with Another Person Includes Vicarious Consent, on Behalf of a Minor Child
In People v Badalamenti, 2016 WL 1306683 (2016) the Court of Appeals held that the definition of consent, in the context of “mechanical overhearing of a conversation” pursuant to Penal Law § 250.00(2), includes vicarious consent, on behalf of a minor child. It established a “narrowly tailored” test for vicarious consent that requires a court to determine (1) that a parent or guardian had a good faith belief that the recording of a conversation to which the child was a party was necessary to serve the best interests of the child and (2) that there was an objectively reasonable basis for this belief. The Court cautioned that its holding should not be interpreted as a vehicle to attempt to avoid criminal liability for the crime of eavesdropping when a parent acts in bad faith and lacks an objectively reasonable belief that a recording is necessary in order to serve the best interests of his or her minor child. Penal Law § 250.05 and CPLR 4506 cannot be so easily circumvented. The procedural vehicles of pretrial hearings must be used to determine the admissibility of any recordings and will result in the suppression of any parent’s recording that a court determines did not meet the narrowly tailored and objective test. In making this admissibility determination, a court should consider the relevant factors, which include, but are not limited to, the parent’s motive or purpose for making the recording, the necessity of the recording to serve the child’s best interests, and the child’s age, maturity, and ability to formulate well-reasoned judgments of his or her own regarding best interests.
Second Circuit Holds that Intimate Partner Violence Is a Relevant Factor in Determining if Fees and Expenses are "Clearly Inappropriate"
In Souratgar v Fair, 2016 WL 1168733 (2d Cir., 2016) the Second Circuit reversed a judgment ordering Respondent Lee Jen Fair to pay to the prevailing petitioner-appellee, Abdollah Naghash Souratgar, $283,066.62 in expenses under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, which directs district courts to issue such an order “unless the respondent establishes that such order would be clearly inappropriate.” 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3). It held that the determination requires district courts to weigh relevant equitable factors, including intimate partner violence. Having reviewed all relevant equitable factors, it concluded that, because the respondent showed that the petitioner engaged in multiple, unilateral acts of intimate partner violence against her and that her removal of the child from the habitual country was related to that violence, and because there were no countervailing factors in the record in favor of the petitioner, such an award would be “clearly inappropriate.”
Court of Appeals Construes "Extended Disruption of Custody", in Domestic Relations Law § 72 (2), in Favor of Grandparents finding they have Standing to Seek Custody
In Suarez v Williams, --- N.E.3d ----, 2015 WL 8788195 (N.Y.), 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 09231, the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Leslie Stein, held that grandparents may demonstrate standing to seek custody, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72 (2) and the Court’s decision in Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys (40 NY2d 543 ) based on extraordinary circumstances where the child has lived with the grandparents for a prolonged period of time, even if the child had contact with, and spent time with, a parent while the child lived with the grandparents. In addition, a parent need not relinquish all care and control of the child. Even if the parent exercises some control over the child, for example during visitation, a parent may still, as a general matter, have voluntarily relinquished care and control of the child to the grandparent to the extent that the grandparent is, in essence, acting as a parent with primary physical custody.
Court of Appeals Holds That There Is No Exception to Physician Patient Privilege for Abuse Admitted to Psychiatrist Even If a Patient Is Cognizant of Psychiatrist's Reporting Obligations under Child Protection Statutes
In People v. David Rivera, No. 20, NYLJ 1202725546913, at *1 (Ct. of App., Decided May 5, 2015) defendant, while seeking treatment from a psychiatrist, admitted to sexually abusing an 11year old relative. The psychiatrist notified the Administration for Children's Services (ACS) of defendant's admission. Following an in camera review of the records, Supreme Court held that the admissions defendant made to his psychiatrist were privileged because they were made in the course of diagnosis and treatment of his condition. However, the court, while refusing to allow "the full extent of defendant's admissions" to be used, held that, because the psychiatrist had disclosed the reported abuse to ACS, the fact that defendant had admitted to the abuse was admissible .The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's ruling ran afoul of the physician patient privilege (see CPLR 4504 [a]). It rejected the People’s claim that, because defendant's admission related to the sexual abuse of a child, it was not privileged since defendant had no reason to believe that it would remain confidential. The Court of Appeals held that regardless of whether a physician is required or permitted by law to report instances of abuse or threatened future harm to authorities, which may involve the disclosure of confidential information, it does not follow that such disclosure necessarily constitutes an abrogation of the evidentiary privilege a criminal defendant enjoys under CPLR 4504 (a).
U.S. Supreme Court Holds that Same-sex Couples May Not Be Deprived of Right to Marry
In Obergefell et Al. V. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et Al., 576 US ____(2015) the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court held that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied to them. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810, a one-line summary decision issued in 1972, holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage did not present a substantial federal question, was overruled, and the State laws challenged by Petitioners in these cases were held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite sex couples.
2015 Child Support Standards Chart released March 6, 2015
According to the Child Support Standards Chart, [LDSS 4515 (3/15)] released March 6, 2015, prepared by New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Division of Child Support Enforcement, the 2015 poverty income guideline amount for a single person as reported by the United States Department of Health and Human Services is $11,770 and the 2015 self-support reserve is $15,890.
View and Download the 2015 Child Support Standards Chart
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